Is Mexico ready to roar? by Erwan Quintin
lum back to the populist and authoritarian
policies that market reforms were meant
to replace. The fear is justified in that the
reforms have not yet improved living
standards to the degree promised. Dur-
ing the 1990s, per capita income in Latin
America was far below that of both Asian
and industrial economies (Chart 1).
Nonetheless, much of the criticism
seems premature for two reasons. First,
market reforms have improved the living
standards in a number of Latin American
countries, such as Chile, Nicaragua, Hon-
duras and Costa Rica. Second, many criti-
cisms typically overlook historical circum-
stances. The drive to market reforms
originated not in purely ideological con-
siderations but in the harsh economic
realities that most Latin American coun-
tries faced in the 1980s.
The Road to Market Reform
From the Great Depression until the
1980s, the apparent success of centrally
planned economies prompted many
developing countries to embrace the
idea that governments, rather than mar-
kets, were best equipped to deliver end-
less prosperity and opportunities to their
Beyond the Border
y the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury, Latin America was sup-
posed to have living standards
comparable with those of developed
nations. At least, that was the implicit
promise behind the ambitious economic
reforms undertaken by most countries in
the region during the last two decades of
the 20th century. Unfortunately, not all
expectations have been fulfilled.
Instead, a wave of dissatisfaction
and questioning of the wisdom of market-
oriented policies is spreading throughout
Latin America and the world. It began
with a vocal antiglobalization minority,
but the ranks of the discontent seem to
be growing, most recently fueled by
Argentina’s 2001–02 meltdown.
Why is Argentina, a country that was
often praised for its reforms and cited as
an example for other emerging econo-
mies, suffering one of the most severe
economic depressions of its history? If
the best student is in deep trouble after
having done what the teacher advised,
what awaits the rest?
Many analysts fear that this wave of
antimarket criticism will swing the pendu-
citizens. In the spirit of centrally planned
economies, most Latin American coun-
tries adopted a growth strategy in the
form of import substitution policies—
those aimed at protecting and develop-
ing national industries through govern-
ment intervention. The results were high
import tariffs, government subsidies,
nationalization of major industries and
other forms of protectionism. Domestic
prices were controlled. Currencies car-
ried a high devaluation-risk premium,
which made equipment imports needed
for industrialization very expensive.
This import substitution strategy
appeared to work at the beginning; GDP
per capita steadily increased at an aver-
age annual rate of 3 percent between
1950 and 1980 (Chart 2). Less apparent,
however, was the debt buildup taking
place at the same time. A foreign debt
crisis erupted, beginning with Mexico in
1982 and spreading throughout Latin
America with such devastation that the
1980s became known as “the lost dec-
ade.” GDP per capita declined at an
average annual rate of 0.7 percent during
the decade. Hyperinflation was endemic.
By 1986, three out of four Latin Ameri-
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bounce-back effect?can countries had inflation rates above
30 percent.
The unparalleled crisis of the lost
decade motivated a policy debate, not
much different in intensity and motiva-
tion from the current one. Heavy-handed
government intervention was rejected
for market reforms in hopes that the
region would return to its fast-track
growth rate of the 1950–80 “golden age.”
Emphasis on the market economy pushed
import substitution policies by the way-
side. Trade opened up. Institutional and
political reforms replaced dictatorships
with democracies. Latin America began
the 1980s with 10 democracies (out of 26
countries); by 1990, all but four countries
were democratic, and by 2000, only
Cuba was not.
The big government era came to an
end. Privatizations—turning over govern-
ment institutions and activities to the pri-
vate sector—became prevalent. Domes-
tic financial systems were deregulated,
and controls on capital flows and foreign
currency transactions were eliminated.
Latin America experienced a dramatic
turnaround in the 1990s. GDP per capita
growth rebounded to positive territory
(Chart 2), and inflation declined. By the
end of 1996, only one country had an
annual inflation rate over 30 percent.
Even so, market reform critics argue
that the progress was unrelated to the
reforms. GDP per capita in the 1990s
grew at rates that, although higher than
in the 1980s, were still about half the
growth rates of the import substitu-
tion era. They conclude that the rela-
tively good performance of the 1990s is
only a natural bounce-back that would
have happened anyway. They also em-
phasize that unemployment has been
climbing throughout Latin America roughly
since the mid-1990s, even in countries
where the reforms seem to have worked
best, such as Chile.
Bumps in the Road
These observations suggest that the
question is not why market-friendly
reforms have not been successful, but
rather why they haven’t been as success-
ful as their advocates promised. Existing
economic theory provides some guid-
ance. The theorem of the second best
asserts that the absence of government
intervention in a particular market or set
of markets does not guarantee a favor-
able outcome for the society as a whole
when imperfections or regulations in
other markets are not removed at the
same time. In other words, introducing
free market reforms in some areas, but
not others, is not necessarily better than
a little bit of government intervention in
all markets.
Although Latin America has made
great progress in some areas, such as
financial and trade liberalization, not
much has been accomplished in terms of
labor market legislation (Chart 3). The
second-best theorem suggests that open-
ing up trade while keeping labor mar-
kets heavily regulated may be bad policy
because it may not guarantee enough
jobs to employ the workers displaced by
trade liberalization.
Domestic policies of the Latin Amer-
ican countries are not the only ones at
fault. Developed countries also have
failed to liberalize trade in agricultural
products, textiles, steel and other com-
modities. Therefore, in another applica-
tion of the second-best theorem, trade
liberalization for one group of countries
is not necessarily the best policy when
the trading partners do not reciprocate.
Thus, both the failure to remove labor
market regulations and the protectionist
policies of developed countries may be
responsible for the underachievement of
market-friendly reforms.
Another theorem, the second-welfare
theorem, may also apply. Roughly stated,
this theorem asserts that a free market
economy can make everyone better off
than an economy without free markets,
provided the losers in the transition from
one regime to the other are appro-
priately compensated. In implementing
market reforms in Latin America, policy-
makers may have overlooked this im-
portant caveat. Stubbornly high poverty
rates may very well be the lingering
social consequence of that omission.
In any case, the market-friendly re-
forms introduced in Latin America since
the 1980s have succeeded in rescuing
the region from the stagnation to which
it seemed condemned during the lost
decade. But these reforms have fallen
short of achieving the prosperity they
promised. However, it is premature to
attribute the failure to any intrinsic short-
comings of the reforms. The evidence
seems to point instead to serious asym-
metries and lack of depth in implemen-
tation.
On the issue of market reforms, as in
almost anything else, the devil seems to
be in the details. No question, those
details may be imperative for the fate of
market reforms. Policymakers and schol-
ars will have to be more aware of the
potential bumps in the road of market-
friendly reforms and engineer ways of
driving over them as smoothly as pos-
sible, without wrecking the economy in
the process.
Provided this challenge is con-
fronted with technical competence and
patience, available economic theory sup-
plies plenty of reasons to be optimistic
about the ultimate ability of market re-
forms to deliver, in due time, on their
prosperity-for-all promises.
— Carlos E. J. M. Zarazaga
Sherry Kiser
Zarazaga is a senior economist and executive
director and Kiser an associate economist
and coordinator in the Research Depart-
ment’s Center for Latin American Economics
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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NOTE: Progress is measured as the change in the index
between 1985 and 1995, divided by 1 minus the value
of the index in 1985. Indexes are simple averages of the
indexes per country.
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